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ABSTRACT 
A ~2200 year-old question related to Hannibal’s invasion route across the Alps 
into Italia, has been argued by classicists without recovery of material evidence. A 
comparison of topographical descriptions in the ancient literature with 
environmental parameters in the Alps, attempted here for the first time, provides a 
database against which various pathways can be assessed. Identification of sites 
using geological, geomorphological, astronomical, chemical and petrological 
methods leads to the exclusion of certain transit points and targeting of others where 
geoarchaeological excavation might yield important evidence related to the military 
culture of ancient Carthage. 
KEYWORDS: Hannibalic invasion of Italia, 218 BC; fired rock controversy; 
geomorphology, geoarchaeology, Alps 
WILLIAM C. MAHANEY et al 
 
40
HISTORICAL-TOPOGRAPHICAL 
BACKGROUND 
Controversy over the exact alpine 
route Hannibal followed from the 
Rhône Basin into Italia has raged 
amongst classicists and ancient 
historians for over two millennia 
(Mommsen, 2006; Wilkinson, 1911; 
Dodge, 1891; Strabo, 1999; Proctor, 
1971). Numerous authorities (de Beer, 
1974; Lancel, 1999; Prevas, 1998; 
Walbank, 1957), after studying the two 
main sources of information on the 
invasion, Polybius (trans. 1979) and 
Livy (trans. 1965), have arrived at 
different conclusions regarding the 
approach route and final col transited 
by the Punic Army on its historic entry 
upon the Po River Plains of northern 
Italia. The invasion, one of the most 
ambitious mountain military 
operations of all time, is important 
because it shifted Roman attention 
from North Africa to the northern 
frontier of the Roman Republic and 
resulted in the near collapse of Rome 
(Goldsworthy, 2001). Since the last 
known written record of the invasion, 
compiled by Silenus, Hannibal’s 
historiographer, was lost at some 
point after Livy (1965) wrote his 
history of the Hannibalic Wars, 
historians have endeavoured to re-
discover the invasion route from 
secondary accounts, which are open to 
considerable interpretation. As 
pointed out by Jourdain-Annequin 
(1999) the lack of primary 
investigators actually visiting the 
approach route and possible cols of 
passage has created a certain ‘myth’ 
about Hannibal and the Punic 
invasion of Italia that can only be 
demystified by ground-truth 
investigations similar to what de Beer 
(1967, 1969) and Prevas (1998) 
attempted in the mid-Twentieth 
Century. Our motivation for 
identifying the route through the Alps 
followed by the Punic Army, albeit 
considering the route itself is of minor 
historic consequence (Walbank, 1957), 
lies in the potential for scientific 
identification of sites of 
geoarchaeological significance. 
Recovery of artifacts from alpine sites 
occupied during the invasion would 
provide new and important 
information on the military culture of 
ancient Carthage heretofore known 
only from material items recovered in 
North Africa (Lancel, 1999; Mahaney, 
2004).  
Three main approach routes 
(Healy, 1994; Hart, 1967; Lazenby, 
1998; de Montholon, 1905) with 
various cols identified as the actual 
transit points into Cisalpine Gaul 
(northern Italy) have been debated 
and discussed by historians (Fig. 1) 
and archaeologists. These are 
variously referred to as the southern, 
northern and intermediate routes. 
(Connolly, 1981; de Beer, 1967). The 
southern route follows the lower 
Rhône River valley northward to the 
Drôme River, thence across the Col de 
Grîmone (1318 m; Alpes du Dauphiné) 
to the Durance Basin, through the 
Queyras (Guil River) to the Col de la 
Traversette, finally exiting into the 
upper Po River catchment; the 
northern route parallels the Rhône 
River to the Isère River, past present-
day Grenoble along the Arc River to 
either the Col du Mont Cenis (2083 m) 
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or Col du Clapier (2497 m), finally 
exiting into the Dora Riparia west of 
Torino; the third route follows the 
same initial course as the northern 
route, then deviates from the Isère 
River near present-day Grenoble and 
follows the Drac River southward, 
west of the Pelvoux Massif, to join the 
Durance River continuing towards the 
Col de Montgenèvre (1830 m). Time 
motion analysis of these three routes 
(Mahaney, 2004; Bagnall, 1999) reveals 
the southern route to be the most 
direct track into northern Italy from 
the Rhône Basin, and all authorities 
(Mommsen, 2006; Prevas, 1998; 
Polybius, trans., 1979) agree that 
Hannibal had to march with speed to 
cross the Alps before winter set in. 
Furthermore, Polybius (trans., 1979), a 
primary ancient authority who 
interviewed survivors of the invasion 
and actually retraced the invasion 
route some sixty years after the fact, is 
definite that Hannibal descended 
upon the Po River Plains rather than 
the Dora Riparia approximately 50 km 
to the north. 
 
 
Fig. 1 Three routes Hannibal may have followed in his historic crossing of the Alps. Routes are 
referenced to key authorities cited in the text. The relative areal extent of Gallic tribes 
(e.g. Taurini) shown is based on de Beer (1967, 1969). Satellite base map courtesy of T. Hare, 
U.S.G.S., Flagstaff, Arizona; credits to USGS/NASA/JPL (from Mahaney, 2009)
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In a recent paper Annequin and 
Barruol (2004) argue for the northern 
route through the Col du Clapier or 
Col de Petit Mont Cenis, basing their 
assumption on an interpretation of 
Polybius, discounting Livy and on the 
supposed regional distribution of 
various tribes. Curiously their map 
mentions the Col de la Traversette but 
makes no mention of de Beer (1967, 
1969), Prevas (1998), amongst others, 
who argue for the southern route 
shown in Figure 1. And whilst the 
authors argue further that Hannibal 
might have easily moved through the 
Col de Montgenèvre, and assert he 
used local guides to surprise the 
Romans (a supposition at best), they 
conclude the Punic Army took the 
northern route through present-day 
Grenoble leading to the Mt. Cenis or 
Col du Clapier (Figure 1). Moreover, 
to argue that Hannibal passed through 
the area of the Allobroges, when 
Polybius (III, 49) is definite he wanted 
to avoid contact with this warlike 
tribe, is to strengthen interest in the 
southern route first proposed by de 
Beer (1967). In addition, the regional 
distribution of the tribes is subject to 
some uncertainty as being nomadic in 
nature they would have changed their 
area of operation from time to time. 
There is no certainty they remained in 
the Isère Valley and the area to the 
north especially when the prospect of 
looting Hannibal’s baggage train 
offered itself.  
Annequin and Barruol (2004) argue 
that Hannibal’s Army was supported 
by lowland Gauls in the area of the 
lower Isère River when, in fact, it is 
well recorded by Polybius, Prevas 
(1998), de Beer (1967, 1969) and Lancel 
(1999) that Hannibal linked up with 
Brancus (lowland Gallic chieftain; 
Roitelet, or ‘local king’ in translation 
from Annequin and Barruol, 2004) 40 
km north of the Rhône Crossing at 
Beaucaire-Tarascon, at least 150 km 
below the confluence of the Isère and 
Rhône rivers. Also, the complete 
discount of Livy’s description of 
events by Annequin and Barruol 
(2004) is not helpful in arriving at a 
meaningful conclusion based on a 
correlation of ancient authorities with 
available environmental evidence 
discussed at length by Mahaney (2004, 
2009) and later in this paper.  
Assuming Hannibal’s approach 
route was to the south, his intended 
path into Cisalpine Gaul must have 
been through the Col de Montgenèvre, 
the pass used regularly by Gauls for 
centuries prior to the invasion. To get 
to the Col de Montgenèvre, Polybius 
(III, 34) documents that Hannibal had 
expert intelligence on the routes 
obtained from agents sent to secure 
the alliance of Gallic tribes (the 
Insubres and Boii; not the Taurini as 
assumed by Annequin and Barruol, 
2004) people inhabiting the region 
around present-day Pavia and 
Bologne in northern Italy. Why 
Hannibal may have deviated from his 
intended route into the Guil River 
catchment from the Durance Basin 
may never be known (de Beer, 1974; 
Bagnall, 1999; Mahaney, 2004, 2009), 
but this undoubtedly unintended 
detour would have taken the Punic 
Army towards the highest and most 
forbidding of all passes (Col de la 
Traversette; 2947 m a.s.l.) into the Po 
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River basin. Two hundred years after 
the invasion the Roman historian 
Varro (Proctor, 1971) referred to a 
major col south of Col de 
Montgenèvre as Hannibal’s Col. The 
only major col that fits the 
environmental descriptions provided 
by Polybius and Livy is the Col de la 
Traversette. 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
TIME/MOTION PARAMETERS  
A recent reconnaissance of the 
possible approach routes and transit 
cols in the Alps confirms the southern 
route as the only approach route that 
best matches the topographical 
descriptions provided by Polybius 
(1979) and Livy (1965). Because 
Polybius actually followed the 
invasion route in developing his 
account, whereas Livy did not, 
Polybius is the preferred early source 
(Lancel, 1999). The five most 
important criteria mentioned by these 
ancient historians and used to validate 
the route are: the presence of firn (old 
snow) along the final pass; an 
extremely steep descent on the Italian 
side; long-distance view into Italia 
from the summit; the occurrence of a 
“landslide” feature that impeded exit 
from the high col; and the possibility 
of fired rock on the lee side 
(documented only by Livy). Livy 
(1965) documents that on the lee side 
of the range Hannibal ordered wood 
laced around blocking boulders 
setting it alight in a successful attempt 
to fracture the rock (Mahaney et al., 
2007b). Of the six possible cols 
associated with the three main 
approaches, only the Col de la 
Traversette (Fig. 2) is within the 
elevation range of sporadic firnpack 
(Mahaney, 2009). 
 
 
Fig. 2 Route across the Col de la Traversette from the upper Guil River valley on the French side 
into the upper Po River valley on the Italian side. The arrow demarcates the position of the upper 
rockfall at 2600 m a.s.l. Air imagery modified from Regione Piemonte (2000) photo no. 5986.  
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Climate conditions in 218 B.C. were 
likely similar to today (Neumann, 
1992) with mean annual temperatures 
similar to today and variable 
distribution of snow and firnpack. 
More importantly, the descent out of 
the Col de la Traversette becomes 
single file at best across a ~30o slope 
(Fig. 3) on metabasalt (Tricart et al., 
2003), which if lichen covered in 
Hannibal’s time would have been 
treacherous in the extreme. Moreover, 
the wet snow cover mentioned by 
Polybius (III, 55) and Livy (XXI, 36) 
would have made the slopes 
increasingly slippery. The need for a 
single file descent brings into question 
the rather short (15-day) interval 
(Polybius, 1979) allotted to Hannibal 
for crossing the Alps by several 
authorities who have studied the 
invasion (Proctor, 1971; de Beer, 1974; 
Lazenby, 1998; Walbank, 1957; 
Bagnall, 1999). Because the crossing is 
known to have occurred at the setting 
of the Pleiades (Walbank, 1957; 
Polybius, 1979; Livy, 1965) it is quite 
likely the Carthaginians were favored 
by a “Hunter’s Moon” (Full Moon on 
October 30; Proleptic Julian Calendar) 
which would have provided sufficient 
light for the descent on the Italian side 
to have taken place on a twenty-four 
hour regimen. The elevation of the 
moon above the horizon at the time of 
transit (about 54 degrees at this site) 
was greater than the average for the 
year, and favourable for illuminating 
the rugged terrain and deepening 
valley of the descent route. 
Nevertheless, single file evacuation of 
~20,000 infantry, ~12,000 cavalry 
(horses plus men), ~10,000 draft 
horses/mules, ~10,000 handlers and 37 
elephants would require an estimated 
~200 hr (i.e. 6-8 24-hour days) to clear 
the col and upper valley.  
 
 
Fig. 3 The ‘chute,’ a narrow path cut in 
metabasalts (Tricart et al., 2003) is located 
on the only path leading out of the Col de 
la Traversette into the upper Po River 
Catchment, approximately 100 meters 
below the col. The narrowness of the path 
(approx. 1 m) necessitates that men/beasts 
move in single file. Movement along this 
narrow ledge route on a 24 hr schedule, 
taking advantage of the Hunter’s Moon, 
would have required 6-8 days to exit the 
col. Slopes rise above 100 m to an arête 
marking the present-day French-Italian 
border and drop off precipitously 150 m to 
the upper Po River (Mahaney, 2009).  
 
Of the cols surveyed only the Col 
de la Traversette has the inordinately 
steep descent blocked by a large 
rockfall/slide [cf. “landslide” identified 
by both Polybius (1979) and Livy 
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(1965)]. Polybius (1979) specifically 
mentions a two-tier blocking rock 
mass, a doublet of one mass 
superposed on another, an example of 
which is found at 2600 m a.s.l. in the 
Upper Po catchment below the Col de 
la Traversette (Fig. 2). All other cols 
(Agnel and de la Croix), immediately 
south and north of the Traversette 
respectively, and Montgenèvre, 
Clapier and Mont Cenis further north, 
lack sufficiently large rockfall/slide 
masses of any age that might have 
blocked the Punic Army. The 
Traversette blocking deposit, 250 m 
long, consists of boulders, cobbles and 
pebbles that wasted away from a 
prominent bedrock bar approximately 
100 m above. The arête to the north is 
a spur trending northwest towards the 
present boundary between France and 
Italy. The lower part of the deposit is 
the oldest and probably dates from the 
Late Glacial when receding ice of the 
Würm/Weichselian Glaciation (cf. 
Mahaney, 1990, for definition of 
glacial stages) first exposed the steep 
slopes of the continental divide to 
intense frost action and to chemical 
weathering. The upper deposit, much 
smaller in size and with a near 
complete lichen cover, probably dates 
from the Neoglacial (<5000 yr BP). Use 
of lichenometry to date these materials 
is limited by the lack of an appropriate 
growth curve for the area; however, 
individual thalli of Rhizocarpon section 
Rhizocarpon up to 110 mm in diameter 
at this elevation would suggest an 
advanced age of >2000 years 
(Mahaney, 1990).  
Soil stratigraphic age dating 
relationships are unknown in the 
Western Alps (Egli et al., 2003) but the 
soil resident in the upper Traversette 
rockfall deposit is an Entisol 
(suborder: Cryorthent; Soil Survey 
Staff, 1999) with an Ah/Cox/Cu 
horizon complex, a pedologic entity 
that could represent weathering over 
an interval of 1000 to 3000 years. This 
soil bears a certain similarity in terms 
of particle size, organic carbon content 
and minor clay mineral alteration to 
soils of similar age studied on the 
Mont Blanc Massif (Mahaney, 1991), 
110 km to the north. The rockfall/slide 
complex below the Col de la 
Traversette consists of schist and 
metabasalt completely devoid of 
calcined surfaces and hence is unfired.  
 
FIRED ROCK CONTROVERSY  
In contrast, 50 km to the north of the 
Col de la Traversette, a 125-m long 
outcrop of amphibolite schist with 
quartz intrusions located below the Col 
du Clapier was fired at some time in 
the past (Sodhi et al., 2006; Beyssac et 
al., 2002). Because some authorities 
believe Hannibal crossed the Alps by 
way of the Col du Clapier (Lazenby, 
1998; Lancel, 1999; Dion, 1962; Huss, 
1985), the presence of fired rock at 
~1693 m a.s.l., ~800 m below the col 
begs the question as to its age and 
whether or not it relates to Hannibal’s 
crossing. Documented by both 
Polybius (1979) and Livy (1965) the exit 
pathway from the high col was blocked 
by a ‘landslide,’ an obstacle sufficiently 
large through which the Carthaginians 
could not pass with their baggage train, 
horses and elephants. There are no 
landslides present above timberline 
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below any of the cols, only rockfall and 
rockslides and combinations thereof. 
According to Livy, Hannibal is said to 
have ordered timber laced around 
boulders and set alight thus fracturing 
large clasts into smaller pieces that 
could be easily removed. The only pass 
in the Western Alps with fired rock 
outcrops is the Col du Clapier, the exit 
pathway lying within the timberline, a 
source of dead timber close to hand. 
Because Polybius (1979) who actually 
visited the site is mute on the subject of 
the firing event it may be a complete 
fabrication concocted by Silenus 
(Hannibal’s historiographer) and 
further related by historians writing 
after the fact (i.e. Livy, 1965). The fired 
rock outcrop is precisely along the 
pathway leading down out of the Col 
du Clapier, and most certainly would 
have been encountered by the 
Carthaginians as they made their way 
to lower elevations had they entered 
Italia from the north, and therefore, it 
needs to be investigated as to its 
composition and age (Sodhi et al., 
2006).  
Attempts to date the carbonized 
crust of the fired outcrops using AMS 
radiocarbon dating so far have failed 
because insufficient carbon was 
recovered from samples following pre-
treatment. Neither carboxyl 
compounds from soot nor hexane 
fragments from the conflagration 
survived the standard digestion 
process. However, ToF-SIMS (Time of 
Flight, Secondary Ion Mass 
Spectrometry) analysis of the burnt 
versus fresh unfired country rock 
revealed the presence of elements 
expected to arise from the combustion 
of wood. Elevated concentrations of K 
and the presence of CO3 provide a clear 
signal of wood ash resulting from 
burned timber (Sodhi et al., 2006). 
Scanning electron microscopic 
analysis (Fig. 4) shows the character of 
the outer schist burnt surface, nicely 
fragmented and slightly carbonized. 
The <0.5 µm blackened rim is the C 
and CH residue left from the firing 
episode while the lighter tones 
represent the heavier elemental 
composition of the amphibolitic schist. 
While the firing episode left 
comparatively little C the fire was 
sufficient to brecciate the outer rim of 
the bedrock shown in contrast with 
the epoxy. 
 
 
Figure 4. SEM micrograph showing the 
character of a subsample of the fired schist. 
Foliation planes in the schist were 
fragmented by the firing episode and a thin 
coating of the fired residue lines some of 
the fractures.  
 
Analysis of the patina of the fired 
schist by Raman Spectroscopy 
provided a spectrum of carbonaceous 
materials, deconvolution of which 
revealed four bands considered 
 HANNIBAL’S TREK ACROSS THE ALPS: GEOMORPHOLOGICAL … 47
significant for disordered graphite 
resulting from the conflagration. The 
Raman spectra (Fig. 5) provide a 
geothermometer of the maximal 
temperatures suffered by metamorphic 
rocks in the range 330-650oC (Beyssac et 
al., 2002); the area ratio of different 
characteristic bands yielding a firing 
temperature of 363oC with an intrinsic 
error of ± 50oC. This result should be 
considered with caution since Beyssac’s 
Method is used to determine the peak 
temperature reached during regional 
metamorphism, which implies a slow 
transformation when compared to the 
instantaneous heating that occurs with 
a forest fire. 
 
 
Figure 5. Raman spectra of carbon-rich 
material in the fired graphitized patina of 
the burnt amphibolite schist. The non-
deconvolved spectra is shown in (a); 
deconvolved spectra in (b) with four 
distinct characteristic bands of 
carbonaceous material (From Mahaney 
et al., 2007a).  
 
The presence of strong red 
coloration in the fired rock below the 
Col du Clapier, suggestive of 
hematization caused by lightning, led 
us to investigate the magnetization of 
the fired and unfired rock at the site 
(Maki, 2005; Verrier & Rochette, 2002). 
Koenigsberger Ratios (remanant 
magnetization / induced magnetiza-
tion) failed to reach the threshold 
levels that would indicate lightning 
impact. However, the absence of 
fulgurite minerals in the fired bedrock 
and disrupted rubble may simply 
indicate a low-energy lightning strike 
with minor transport of rock 
fragments (Barnett, 1911; Grapes, 
2006). Because the fired bedrock site is 
located across a wide drainage way 
that would channel surface runoff into 
the lower valley it may well act as a 
conduit for electrical discharge during 
a storm. However, the data do not 
negate the possibility of a lightning 
induced conflagration.  
Unfortunately, contrary to the 
hypothesis advanced by Annequin and 
Barruol (2004) that Hannibal took the 
northern route, there is little to 
recommend the Col du Clapier as 
Hannibal’s entrance point to Cisalpine 
Gaul. There is no firnpack 
(accumulations of old dense snow) 
present that is one of the prime 
prerequisites for the correct col and 
entrance route into Italia. The view into 
Italia, considered by most authorities 
(de Beer, 1969; Lazenby, 1998 for 
example) to be a prime criterion for the 
correct col, from the Col du Clapier is 
restricted to no more than 5-6 km 
reaching to the far end of the Val 
Clarea. The blocking rockfall below the 
entrance col to Italia, described both by 
Livy and Polybius, is missing below 
the Col du Clapier. The rockfall, which 
exists at the fired rock site is too small 
in volume and of insufficient size to 
block an army. Most clasts are less than 
0.5 m diameter, small enough to be 
moved easily even by starving soldiers 
(Polybius, 1979; Livy, 1965). A major 
unanswered question about the fired 
rock outcrop is the expected age of 
fired rock in general, its longevity 
WILLIAM C. MAHANEY et al 48
determined pretty much on the 
strength of relative-age dating methods 
(see for example, Mahaney, 1990). 
Lichen encrustation on the fired 
material is nil which suggests a young 
age, perhaps little more than a century 
or two. Rock weathering and ultimate 
erosion which would remove the 
carbonized rock is unknown with any 
exactitude but weathering rinds on the 
fired rock suggest fired rock might 
persist for at least a millennium or 
longer.  
 
KEY GEOARCHAEOLOGICAL 
SITES  
According to Polybius (1979) it 
took three days for the Punic Army to 
forge a path through the blocking 
rockfall wide enough to accommodate 
horses and elephants. A field survey 
of the six likely passes used by the 
Carthaginians revealed that the only 
mass wasted deposit of sufficient size 
to block an army is located in the 
upper Po River at 2600 m elevation 
below the Col de la Traversette. The 
path ballast at the Traversette rockfall 
site is two meters thick in most places 
giving the impression that down slope 
movement in the rockfall has 
necessitated reinforcement of the exit 
pathway many times, possibly even 
prior to Hannibal’s egress from the 
high col. Beyond the main (250 m 
long) rockfall is another, smaller slide 
mass about 50 meters in length that 
may have added to the difficulty of 
clearing an exit to the lower valley.  
Once beyond the rockfall/slide 
barrier, Hannibal is said to have 
regrouped for two days in the lower 
valley (Polybius, 1979; Livy, 1965). At 
the 1900 m elevation below the Col de 
la Traversette a vast plain of alpine 
grass and sedge with plentiful water 
supply provides a site correlating well 
with the ancient literature. Stonewalls 
(Fig. 5) lacing part of the meadow and 
now partially buried in the alpine soil 
have probably been used as bivouacs 
for centuries if not millennia. Boulders 
in these interconnecting walls support 
lichen cover similar to the rockfall in 
the upper valley and may be of similar 
age. Exploratory archaeological 
excavation of these stonewalls might 
eventually lead to the recovery of 
artifacts that could provide important 
information on the military culture of 
ancient Carthage. An army, consisting 
of 26,000 men, several thousand 
horses and handlers and 37 elephants 
(Polybius, 1979) could be expected to 
leave behind numerous personal 
items, which have never been found 
by the researchers who have visited 
but not explored the prospective sites 
from Mt. Cenis (final col favored by 
Napoleon, de Montholon, 1905) and 
Col du Clapier (Annequin and 
Barruol, 2004) in the north to the Col 
Agnel in the south. 
While the numbers of troops and 
animals involved are hypothetical, the 
26,000 figure documented by Polybius 
from the bronze tablet in the Temple 
of Hera at Cape Lacinium (Polybius, 
III, 33) is considered correct by most 
modern workers (de Beer, 1969; 
Lazenby, 1998; Lancel, 1999). Thus 
with this number of Carthaginian 
infantry and cavalry and 37 elephants 
it is reasonable to assume his baggage 
train contained at least 10,000 and 
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most probably as many as 15,000 
horses and mules for which a 
minimum of 5000 handlers would be 
needed. Adding in cooks, artificers, 
armourers and engineers, the entire 
army probably numbered in excess of 
50,000 humans and beasts of all 
description as it lumbered over the 
Col de la Traversette into Italia.  
 
DISCUSSION 
Were it not for the fired rock 
outcrop at the Clapier the entrance to 
Italia would be rather easy to 
determine provided one visited and 
studied the topography and 
geomorphology at all possible sites. 
As Jourdain-Annequin (1999) points 
out ‘the myth of Hannibal’ or the 
controversy over the invasion route 
fuelled by many ancient and modern 
historians mostly stemming from 
inadequate field research and the 
tendency for many authors to quote 
previous sources without actually 
visiting and working at the various 
localities. The only workers to visit all 
the sites are de Beer (1967, 1969), 
Seibert (1993), Prevas (1998), Lazenby 
(1998) Lancel (1999) and Hunt (quoted 
in Boser, 2007) and the only workers 
to rely on detailed topographic and 
natural historical investigations are de 
Beer (1967, 1969) and Mahaney (2004, 
2007). As illustrated here Earth 
scientific investigations have much to 
offer in the way of determining the 
exact route Hannibal followed during 
the invasion of Italia in 218 BC.  
On the topographic side the oft-
quoted criterion that Hannibal 
stopped at the high pass and 
motioned off in the direction of the 
plains of the Po, if indeed this ever 
happened, the most likely candidate is 
the Traversette as documented by de 
Beer (1967, 1969). Further, if one 
considers the steep slopes described 
by Livy and Polybius on the lee side of 
the range, one is forced to consider the 
Traversette as the main candidate 
because it is the only route into Italia 
that contains sufficient sheer cliffs one 
might topple over. None of the other 
approach routes offer the same 
topographic obstacle on a scale 
compatible with what Polybius 
describes. And nowhere are there 
cliffs that reach the height described 
by Livy (XXI, 36) reaching a thousand 
foot (~300 m) drop. Only the Col de la 
Croix comes close but then the slopes 
are so heavily wooded one would 
have to be overly creative to fail to 
grab a tree upon loosing footing. All 
ancient sources stipulate that 
Hannibal debouched from the Alps 
onto the plains of the Po 
topographically distinct from the 
plains of the Dora Riparia, the latter 
catchment draining both the Col de 
Mt. Cenis and the Col du Clapier. If 
one accepts this topographic 
distinction, and assuming the place 
names have been in vogue for at least 
the last two millennia as indicated by 
de Beer (1967, 1969), it supports the 
southerly route not the northern one.  
On the environmental side the 
main criteria include: presence of 
firnpack (heavy dense perennial 
snow) described by both key ancient 
authorities; extreme height of the 
ultimate col of passage; sheer cliffs on 
the lee side; two-tier rockfall on the lee 
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side; and grassy regrouping area 
below the rockfall. These criteria are 
crucial to picking the right approach 
route and ultimate col of passage. The 
only candidate possible would have to 
be situated in and around the 3000-
meter contour and with sufficient high 
rock buttresses off to the south to 
provide a microclimate sufficient to 
allow the ground to remain frozen 
during the summer months (see 
Mahaney et al., 2007b for a discussion 
of permafrost in the western Alps). 
The Traversette is the only col within 
the right elevation range to qualify for 
passage by the Punic Army; all other 
cols are ~500 meters lower or in the 
case of the Col Agnel lacking the 
correct microclimate. As discussed 
above what we consider to be the 
strongest evidence pointing towards 
the Traversette as the entrance to Italia 
is the presence of the two-tier rockfall 
detailed by Polybius as the rubble 
sheet that stopped Hannibal’s descent 
into the Po River plains. All the 
possible entrance points into Italia 
have rubble sheets in places but only 
the Traversette at 2600 m elevation 
contains the surficial feature described 
so accurately by Polybius. Moreover 
this suggests that Polybius actually 
passed over the Traversette some 70 
years after the invasion as how else 
could he have observed and known 
the blocking rubble was a two-time 
event. It would take an astute observer 
to pick out the two deposits and to 
correctly interpret them as separate 
events.  
The regrouping area below the 
blocking rockfall might be identified 
at one of several places. A close read 
of Polybius (III, 56) suggests the 
refitting area was close-by, perhaps 
within eyesight of the rockfall. This 
could include the area below the Col 
du Clapier, the Col Agnel and the Col 
de la Croix but these areas would not 
accommodate the number of troops 
and animals involved. Below the Col 
de la Traversette the grassy area below 
the 2000-meter contour and just up-
valley from Crissolo could 
accommodate the ~50,000 humans and 
beasts populating the invasion force. 
More than this the water discharge in 
the Upper Po River below the 
Traversette is fed from three main 
streams approximately twice to three 
times the volume one might expect at 
the other sites. And water must surely 
have been a key item to prevent 
dehydration and necessary for the 
preparation of whatever food supplies 
remained with the baggage train.  
The presence of an intricate 
network of sunken walls in the upper 
Po River Valley suggests the area has 
been used as a bivouac for well over a 
millennium and possibly much longer 
(Fig. 6). This, together with the 
reinforced thick ballast underlying the 
roadway through the upper rockfall, 
further indicates the roadway has 
been rebuilt and strengthened many 
times over the centuries. Lichen 
diameters and total cover on moved 
boulders suggest parts of the roadway 
and the wall network date from 
antiquity. If one assumes from what is 
known from lichen growth in high 
mid-latitude alpine localities 
(Benedict, 1967, 1968; Birkeland, 1973; 
Mahaney, 1990, 1991; Mahaney and 
Spence, 1984) similar in kind to the 
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Traversette, the walls and part of the 
roadway date from within the 3rd 
Century BC or the time of Hannibal’s 
crossing. 
 
 
Fig. 6 A series of interconnected stonewalls 
sunken into soils in the upper alpine 
meadow at ~1950 m lay adjacent to fresh 
water supplies in the Upper Po River. There 
are no bog deposits that might yield 14C 
dates but alluvial peat profiles and 
abundant hearths offer the possibility of 
obtaining a chronology. The site may be the 
regrouping area described by Polybius 
(1979, III, 55) where the army pitched camp 
while the pathway was constructed through 
the rockfall.  
 
The climate of the major cols 
during the Hannibalic Wars is similar 
to the climate existing today even 
considering that with global warming 
snowbank cover is slowly thinning 
along with glacier volumes. Had 
Hannibal crossed a thousand years 
earlier during the middle Neoglacial 
or sixteen hundred years later during 
the Little Ice Age he would have 
encountered harsher conditions with 
expanded snow cover even in summer 
and active glacier advances. As it 
turned out Hannibal’s invasion 
occurred during the most opportune 
climatic event that would cause the 
least difficulty.  
CONCLUSION  
It is hoped that with renewed 
interest in the natural history of the 
region, pioneered by Sir Gavin de Beer 
in the mid-20th century, future 
geoarchaeological investigations of 
hearths on the French side of the Col 
de la Traversette, the rockfall on the 
lee side and the regrouping area 
below the 2000-meter contour will 
yield material artifacts that will shed 
light on the military culture of ancient 
Carthage. It might prove difficult to 
link the remains to Hannibal 
principally because his brother 
Hasdrubal brought a relief army 
across the Alps by an unknown route 
in 207 BC but geoarchaeological 
excavations may well recover 
numismatical evidence as well as 
implements/weapons of various kinds.  
The rock firing event described by 
Livy remains contentious primarily 
because Polybius fails to mention it in 
his history. A major event such as this, 
if indeed it did occur, would hardly 
have gone unrecorded by Polybius 
and would not have escaped his 
attention. However, the presence of 
carbonized bedrock below the Col du 
Clapier, adjacent to a small volume of 
rockfall, proved impossible to date by 
AMS radiocarbon. Since the fired site 
has been open to the subaerial 
atmosphere since the conflagration, 
OSL dating remains problematical 
because the blackened surface (100-500 
nm thick) is constantly bleached and 
zeroed. It may well be possible, in 
future, to date the firing event by 
focussing on the ~2 mm 
fractured/brecciated layer below the 
carbonized crust to determine if 
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electron capture might provide an age 
compatible with relative-age dating 
which suggests the firing event is 
recent, i.e. within the last century or 
two. While not conclusive, the 
available evidence indicates the firing 
event is likely anecdotal, possibly the 
product of hubris invented by an 
ancient author (s), recounted by Livy, 
and unrelated to the Hannibalic 
invasion of Italia. In any case, if the 
firing was intended to forge a path 
through an ancient rockfall, as 
recounted by Livy, the low volume of 
rubble present at the site and small 
diameter of clasts that could easily be 
removed by hand would not have 
required the extreme measure of 
gathering timber to set the site aflame. 
  
Acknowledgements 
This research was carried out with funding from Quaternary Surveys to WCM, 
VK and RWD, and grants from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research 
Council of Canada to RB and RWB. Establishment of Surface Interface–Ontario (RS) 
was made possible by the Canadian Foundation for Innovation and matching 
contributors (www.si-ontario.utoronto.ca). 
 
REFERENCES  
Connolly, P. (1981) Greece and Rome at War, MacDonald and Co. 
Bagnall, General Sir N. (1999) The Punic Wars, Oxford, Oxford, UK, 347 p.  
Barnett, V.H. (1911) An example of disruption of rock by lightning on one of the 
lucite hills in Wyoming, Journal of Geology 16 (6), 568-571.  
Benedict, J.B. (1967) Recent glacial history of an alpine area in the Colorado Front 
Range, U.S.A. I, Establishing a lichen growth-curve. Journal of Glaciology 
6, 817-832. 
Benedict, J.B. (1968) Recent glacial history of an alpine area in the Colorado Front 
Range, U.S.A. II, Dating the glacial deposits. Journal of Glaciology 7, 77-87.  
Beyssac, O., Goffé, B., Chopin, C. & Rouzaud, and N. (2002) Raman spectra of 
carbonaceous material in metasediments: a new geothermometer, Journal 
of Metamorphic Geology 20, 859-871.  
Birkeland, P.W., (1973) Use of relative age dating methods in a study of rock glacier 
deposits, Mt. Sopris, Colorado. Arctic and Alpine Research, 5, 401-416. 
Boser, U. (2007) Hiking with Hannibal. Archaeology 60, 36-41. 
de Beer, Sir G. (1967) Hannibal’s March, Sidgwick & Jackson, London, UK, 164 p. 
de Beer, Sir G. (1969) Hannibal: Challenging Rome’s Supremacy, Viking Press, N.Y., 320 p. 
de Beer, G. (1974) Hannibal: the Struggle for power in the Mediterranean, Book Club 
Assoc., London, UK. 320 p.  
de Montholon, J.F.T. (1905) Memories of Sainte Hélène, vol. IV, pp. 277-28. Paris : 
Garnier. 
Dion, R. (1962) La voie héracléenne et l’itinéraire transalpine d’Hannibal. In: 
Mélanges à A. Grenier (coll. Latomus), LVIII, Brussels, 132-147 
 HANNIBAL’S TREK ACROSS THE ALPS: GEOMORPHOLOGICAL … 53
Dodge, T.A. (1891) Hannibal, Houghton Mifflin, N.Y.682 p.  
Egli, M., Mirabella, A., Sartori, G., & Fitze, P. (2003) Weathering rates as a function of 
climate: results from a climosequence of the Val Genova (Trentino) 
Italian Alps, Geoderma 111, 99-121. 
Goldsworthy, A. (2001) Cannae, Cassell, London, UK, 200 p.  
Grapes, R. (2006) Pyrometamorphism, Springer, NY, 276 p.  
Hart, B.H.L. (1967) Strategy, Faber and Faber, London, UK. 420 p.  
Healy, M. (1994 Cannae 216 BC, Osprey, London, UK, 96 p.  
Huss, W. (1985) Geschichte der Karthager, Handbuch des Altertumwissenschaft. 
Munich, III, 8.  
Jourdain-Annequin, C., (1999) L’image de la montagne ou la géographie à l’épreuve 
du mythe et de l’histoire: l’exemple de la traversée des Alpes par 
Hannibal, Dialogues d’Histoire Ancienne 25, 101-127. 
Annequin, C. & Barruol, G. (2004) Les grandes traversées des Alpes: l’itinéraire 
d’Hannibal, In, Annequin, C., & Le Berre, M , Atlas Culturel des Alpes 
Occidentales: de la Préhistoire à la fin du Moyen Age, Picard, Paris, 100-101.  
Lancel, S. (1999) Hannibal, Blackwell, London, 243 p.  
Lazenby, J.F. (1998) Hannibal’s War, U. Oklahoma Press, Norman, Okla., 340 p.  
Livy (1965) trans., A. de Selincourt. The War with Hannibal, Penguin, 709 p.  
Mahaney, W.C. (1990) Ice on the Equator, Wm Caxton, Ellison Bay, Wisc. 386 p.  
Mahaney, W.C. (1991) Late Pleistocene and Holocene glacial chronology at 
Chamonix and Argentière, French Alps, Zeitschrift für Geomorphologie 35, 
225-237. 
Mahaney, W.C., and Spence, J.R. (1984) Glacial and periglacial sequence and floristics 
in Jaw Cirque, central Teton Range, western Wyoming, American Journal 
of Science, 284, 56-81. 
Mahaney, W.C. (2004) Hannibal’s invasion of Italia in 218 BC: geological 
reconnaissance of the alpine route. In., Caldwell, D.R., et al. eds. Studies 
in Military Geography and Geology, Kluwer, 67-78. 
Mahaney, W.C., Milner, M.W., Sodhi, Rana, Dorn, R.I., Boccia, S., Beukens, R.P., 
Tricart, P., Schwartz, S., Chamorro-Perez, Eva, Barendregt, R.W., Kalm, 
V., & Dirszowsky, R.W. (2007a) Analysis of burnt schist outcrops in the 
Alps: relation to historical archaeology and Hannibal’s crossing in 218 
BC. Geoarchaeology, 22, 799-818. 
Mahaney, W.C., Miyamoto, H., Dohm, J., Baker, V., Cabrol, N., Grin, E., & Berman, 
D.J. (2007b) Rock glaciers on Mars: Earth-based clues to Mars’ recent 
paleoclimatic history. Journal of Planetary and Space Sciences 55, (1-2), 181-
192.  
Mahaney, W.C. (2009), Hannibal’s Odyssey: environmental background to the 
invasion of Italia, Gorgias Press, Piscataway, N.J., in press. 
Maki, D. (2005) Lightning strikes and prehistoric ovens: determining the source of 
magnetic anomalies using techniques of environmental magnetism, 
Geoarchaeology 20, 449-459.  
WILLIAM C. MAHANEY et al 54
Mommsen, T.A. (2006) A History of Rome, Folio Soc., London, UK, 771 p.  
Neumann, J., (1992) Climatic conditions in the Alps in the years about the year of 
Hannibal’s crossing (218 BC). Climatic Change 22, 139-150.. 
Polybius, (1979) trans. I. Scott-Kilvert. The Rise of the Roman Republic, Penguin, 574 p.  
Prevas, J. (1998) Hannibal crosses the Alps, Sarpedon, Rockville Centre, NY, 232 p.  
Proctor, D. (1971) Hannibal’s March in History, Oxford U. Press, UK, 229 p.  
Seibert, J. (1993) Hannibal, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, p. 75-134. 
Sodhi, R.N.S., Mahaney, W.C. & Milner, M.W. (2006) ToF-SIMS applied to historical 
archaeology in the Alps, Applied Surface Science 252, 7140-7143.  
Soil Survey Staff, (1999), Soil Taxonomy, a Basic System of Soil Classification for making 
and interpreting soil Surveys, U.S. Government Printing Office, Pittsburgh, 
Pa., 871 p.  
Strabo (1999) trans. H. Jones, Geography, Loeb Classical Library. 
Tricart, P. et al., (2003) Aiguilles-Col Saint-Martin, Carte Géologique de la France. 
1:50000.  
Verrier, V., Rochette, P. (2002) Estimating peak currents at ground lightning impacts 
using remanent magnetisation. Geophysical Research Letters 29, 14-1 - 14-4.  
Walbank, F.W. (1957) A Historical Commentary on Polybius, Vol. 1., Commentary on 
Books I-VI, Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK.  
Wilkinson, S. (1911) Hannibal’s march through the Alps, Oxford, Clarendon. 
 
 
